The Russian Threat in the Arctic and U.S. Interests

The previous U.S. National Strategy For The Arctic Region (NSAR) was prepared back in 2013 by President Barack Obama’s administration. “It was supposed to be updated by early 2022,” says Devon Brennan, director for Maritime & Arctic Security at the National Security Council. – But we had to take a long pause on February 24 to see what further Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean for our Arctic policy.”

Brennan spoke about progress on NSAR at an Oct. 25, 2022, meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.

The new Arctic strategy focuses heavily on the global impact of Russia’s war on the European continent: “Russia’s war in Ukraine has increased geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, as well as around the world, creating new risks of unintended conflict and impeding cooperation… Russia’s war in Ukraine has doubled NATO’s unity and resolve and spurred efforts to expand NATO resources.”

Historically, the Arctic has been a region of peaceful cooperation where issues have been resolved diplomatically,” notes Gregory Pollock, Principal Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense. – But Russia’s new unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which follows a series of other aggressive Russian actions in recent years aimed at violating the rules-based international order, has changed that dynamic. Russia’s actions inevitably affect security in the Arctic, as today Moscow has made it virtually impossible for other Arctic countries to cooperate in any meaningful way with itself.

At the same time, the situation in the Arctic has a long-term significance in its own right:

The growing strategic importance of the Arctic has intensified competition for shaping its future… Over the past decade, Russia has invested heavily in its military presence in the Arctic. It is modernizing its military bases and airfields; deploying new coastal missile and air defense systems and modernized submarines; and increasing the number of military exercises and training operations with a new combat command equivalent for the Arctic. Russia is also developing new economic infrastructure in its Arctic territories to develop hydrocarbons, minerals and fishing, and is trying to limit freedom of navigation with its excessive maritime claims along the Northern Sea Route.

To make matters worse, the Arctic Council, the main international body set up 27 years ago during the period of détente and cooperation and comprising eight countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States), is now having a hard time because Russia has become the next two-year rotating chair of the Council in 2021. Meanwhile, all other members of the Arctic Council are members of NATO (including the newly joining Finland and Sweden). This is perhaps the biggest strategic advantage in the Arctic: there is no other region of the world with such a high concentration of like-minded states with such a high level of military capabilities.

In this situation, the United States must show leadership, the meeting participants said. “While Russia’s war in Ukraine has made cooperation with Moscow almost impossible at this time, the United States will continue to support Arctic cooperation institutions and position them to manage the consequences of growing activity in the region,” says Maxine Burkett, deputy assistant secretary of state for Oceans, Fisheries and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State.

The active position of the USA made it possible for the Arctic Council to continue its work: “The seven like-minded Arctic states have resumed work on projects in which Russia does not take part. That’s about 60% of the working group projects. Right now we’re working with Norway on a health team training next month in Tromsø, and this is an important example of how Arctic Council stakeholders can continue to strengthen regional health security and resilience to climate change even in challenging times,” Maxine Burkett said.

Of the four pillars of U.S. Arctic policy (security, climate change and environmental protection, economic development, international cooperation in the region), the new NSAR gives first place to strategic security: “growing strategic competition in the Arctic, exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine” requires the United States to “compete effectively to manage tensions,” “requires U.S. leadership at home and abroad… in this dynamic and challenging period,” the fifteen-page document states.

“Clearly, the Arctic can no longer be considered as peaceful and cooperative today as it once was,” sorrowfully states David Balton, Executive Director, Arctic Executive Steering Committee, Office of Science & Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President of the United States. – It`s not all peace and stability, and we have to be vigilant and go the extra mile to make sure we keep peace in the Arctic.

As a Defense Department spokesman, Gregory Pollock adds: “After decades of temperate operations, the Department of Defense has to build up its Arctic capabilities today to deter challenges, mitigate risks, and respond effectively. Nevertheless, we still have some work to do to make sure that the methods and means are sufficient to achieve our security goals, even though the Pentagon’s primary focus under its national defense strategy still remains on the Indo-Pacific.”

David Belton also touches on economic growth in the Arctic region, which includes the 49th state of Alaska: “It’s clear to me that Alaska’s economy needs to grow and it needs to change. About 90% of the state’s business income today comes from oil and gas production.” With Russia triggering price and trade wars on the hydrocarbon market in Europe and the world in 2022, that sounds positive, but overall the world is “definitely moving in the direction of reducing the revenue share from oil and gas development, although not as fast as it needs to be,” Belton said. – So a new economy has to take shape in Alaska, which the federal government, in partnership with the state government, is trying to move forward.”

Belton also mentioned the development of a deep-water port in Nome in connection with the strategic containment situation in Russia. “Building several new icebreakers to operate in the Arctic right now is critical,” he said. “Expanding the U.S. icebreaker fleet and coast guard to maintain a permanent U.S. presence in the Arctic and an additional presence as needed in the European Arctic,” is highlighted as a separate priority in the new Strategy.

Gregory Pollock also recalled the opening of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies DoD’s Regional Center in Alaska in late 2021, “which will serve as a center for analysis and education in the Arctic region and provide a forum for allies and partners to share views and best practices regarding work in the Arctic.”

Pollock was quick to add, however, that “regular exercises” and “demonstrating the presence and development of combat fighter aircraft” – apparently referring to the deployments of the world’s most powerful Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft in Alaska – are key to “providing the advantage in this critical area” necessary to “deter our competitors.